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National Energy and Climate Plans in Central and Eastern Europe: Contradictions on the path to regional decarbonisation
Since ratifying the Paris Agreement, the European Union has taken a leading role in combating climate change across the five core dimensions of the Energy Union: strengthening energy security, decarbonising the economy, improving energy efficiency, reinforcing the internal energy market and promoting research, innovation and competitiveness.
It adopted Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 on the Governance of the Energy Union and Climate Action, which established the legal foundation for National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs). Under this framework, each Member State must prepare its own NECP, serving as a strategic roadmap to align national energy and climate priorities with the EU’s common objectives. These plans are designed to contribute to the Union’s 2030 climate targets – notably, the 55 per cent greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction compared to 1990 levels – while fostering closer coordination among Member States.
The final versions of the first set of NECPs covering the 2021–2030 period were submitted to the European Commission by the end of 2019. They have since been revised and updated to reflect the higher ambition level introduced by the European Climate Law (Regulation (EU) 2021/1119), as well as the Fit for 55 package and the REPowerEU plan.
NECPs: structural and substantive challenges
The main formal requirement that every NECP must fulfil is to cover all five key dimensions of the Energy Union. In practice, the Governance Regulation expects far more: a comparable structure, clear milestones, links to the budget, and detailed timelines for permitting and grid development. However, the absence of these elements is a major source of problems.
First, while some Member States formally address all five dimensions, many fail to set quantified, time-bound national targets for each, causing certain priorities to be sidelined while others receive disproportionate attention. Second, the loose framework and inadequate coordination also generate inconsistencies between national commitments – a problem that is particularly acute in Central and Eastern Europe, where deep regional interconnections in electricity and gas markets would require much stronger alignment of grid development and permitting timelines. The region’s internal energy market depends greatly on imports, and these high import rates raise serious questions about how diversification and energy security can be achieved effectively.
Third, structural and methodological differences in NECPs hamper comparability: EU Member States rely on different data sources, measurement definitions and units, and distinct forecasting methodologies. Although the updated national plans increasingly draw on the latest available data, the Commission’s assessments highlight the risks posed by outdated projections and missing financing and permitting roadmaps.
Therefore, evaluating targets against actual performance becomes extremely difficult, undermining the effectiveness of the common EU strategy. Fourth, the structure and substantive coherence of most NECPs vary widely. The emphasis is overwhelmingly on expanding generation capacity. However, demand-side energy efficiency and flexibility, both essential for sustainability, are significantly underrepresented. This one-sided approach impedes the development of system-level solutions that also tackle grid and permitting bottlenecks, further widening divergences between Member States.
The submission and assessment process
All Member States submitted their initial NECP drafts by the end of 2018, followed by final plans by December 31, 2019. In June 2019, the Commission published detailed country assessments of the draft NECPs with criticisms and recommendations, and on September 17, 2020, it issued an EU-wide assessment of the final plans, accompanied by individual country analyses as part of the 2020 Energy Union report.
These findings were expected to be meaningfully reflected in the draft updated NECPs due by June 30, 2023, and in the final updated NECPs by June 30, 2024, taking into account the heightened climate ambitions adopted in the meantime. In December 2023, infringement procedures were launched against Bulgaria, Poland, and Austria for failing to submit updated drafts.
During 2024–2025, the list of countries falling behind grew to thirteen, but by autumn 2025, most member states caught up. On May 28, 2025, the Commission released its Union-wide assessment covering the final updated NECPs of 23 Member States. Belgium, Estonia, and Poland had not yet submitted their plans by the cut-off date, while Slovakia’s plan arrived too late to be included. At the time of writing, Poland remains the only Member State without a final updated NECP – a delay that is particularly critical for the region, given Poland’s heavy coal dependence and the need for coordinated decarbonization efforts.
Climate policy contradictions in the Visegrad Group
A study published in April 2024 in Environmental Science & Policy, titled “Climate policy contradictions in light of the policy paradigms – the case of the Visegrád Countries,” highlights the divergent climate- and energy-policy ambitions in Central and Eastern European countries, particularly the V4. Implementation hinges largely on financing, institutional capacity, and national characteristics, creating significant gaps compared with Western European commitments.
In the first NECP cycle, lower ambition levels – especially regarding renewable-energy rollout – were typical across the region. Although ambition has increased since then, economic competitiveness often still takes precedence, and NECP commitments risk remaining largely formal exercises aimed at meeting minimum EU requirements, rather than fully operational strategic tools. Energy security concerns and other policy measures frequently override decarbonization goals and the pace of fossil-fuel phase-out.
Recent Commission assessments and independent trackers broadly converge on three areas where further efforts will be decisive. First, higher 2030 ambitions need to be matched by detailed, costed policy packages. Second, grid and permitting bottlenecks must be addressed to avoid slowing renewable build-out and cross-border flows. Third, persistent import dependency has to be managed more proactively, as it can increase exposure to price and security shocks.
Regional challenges and country-specific risks
Central and Eastern European NECPs remain overwhelmingly focused on national priorities, despite the region facing essentially identical implementation challenges. GHG emissions must be progressively reduced in line with EU objectives while still meeting growing energy demand from reliable sources.
Austria has adopted an early climate-neutrality target for 2040, while Romania couples its 2050 climate-neutrality horizon with a highly ambitious 78 per cent GHG-reduction goal for 2030. Yet Commission assessments point to gaps between these headline targets and the underlying sectoral measures, particularly in terms of fully quantified, costed policies for fossil-fuel phase-out and the enabling renewable infrastructure.
Slovenia and Croatia illustrate the practical benefits of long-standing bilateral arrangements: the jointly owned Krško nuclear power plant provides stable, low-carbon baseload to both countries. Slovenia’s updated NECP raises its 2030 renewables targets while deferring a decision on a second nuclear unit until 2028, aiming to safeguard security of supply amid a coal phase-out scheduled for 2033.
Croatia’s updated NECP sets higher 2030 climate and energy ambitions, yet the plan still places significant emphasis on gas infrastructure, which may underutilise the country’s substantial solar potential and slow progress towards greater energy independence.
Bulgaria is one of the few net electricity exporters in Southeast Europe, but it still imports smaller volumes at times of high demand or low domestic generation, mainly from Greece and Romania, and increasingly from non-EU neighbours (such as Serbia, Türkiye and North Macedonia) where carbon-intensive power is cheaper partly because it is not covered by the EU Emissions Trading System.
Hungary aims for a 50 per cent GHG reduction and a 30 per cent renewable share in gross final energy consumption by 2030, with renewables delivering 32 per cent of electricity generation – a goal in which the ongoing large-scale expansion of solar capacity plays a pivotal role. In 2024, Hungary had the highest share of solar energy in total electricity generation in the world (approximately 25 per cent).
Slovakia’s updated NECP sets a high decarbonization target of 64.3 per cent GHG reduction by 2030; however, it provides limited clarity on investment needs, financing mechanisms, and a concrete roadmap for phasing out fossil fuel subsidies. Poland remains one of the EU’s largest CO₂ emitters and accounted for 97 per cent of EU hard-coal production in 2024 (approximately 44 million tonnes), while repeatedly falling behind in updating its strategies. Within the V4, Poland stands out for explicitly prioritising cost-effectiveness over clear climate targets in its adaptation approach.
Across the region, the plans converge on three strategic priorities that offer clear synergies: accelerated grid reinforcement along North–South and East–West corridors, coordinated development of flexible resources (such as storage, demand response, and hydrogen-ready gas plants), and harmonised permitting and market rules.
This post is a reprint of an article written by our colleagues, which was originally published on December 9, 2025, in the online journal CEEnergy News.
