Climate Policy

EU Disagreement on a Key Matter Could Spell Disaster

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Introduced in late 2024, the European Commission’s (EC) European Green Deal was presented as more than a mere environmental strategy—it was intended as a framework for the EU’s future economic and industrial policy. It aimed to make Europe the first climate-neutral continent by 2050—a goal subsequently enshrined in the European Climate Law. 

To reach this long-term goal, the EU needs medium-term, clear, and credible targets. Thus, the EC proposed a 90% greenhouse-gas-emissions reduction by 2040. It also emphasized that member states’ National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) provide the framework for the implementation. Medium-term targets not only clarify commitments between 2030 and 2050, but also help ensure that decisions on decarbonization regulations, investments, and industrial policy rest on a predictable long-term framework. Under the EC’s proposal, EU climate targets could also be partially achieved through international carbon credit trading. However, many cases have since come to light in which credits from voluntary carbon markets did not actually contribute to the fight against climate change, and, in extreme instances, resulted in environmental exploitation, corporate greenwashing, and human rights violations. Political decisions alone are insufficient; the 2040 targets also hinge on the soundness of the NECPs and the credibility of the tools underpinning their implementation. Below is the second article in a three-part NECP critique by the Institute for Energy Strategy.

Why Medium-Term Climate Targets Matter

Setting medium-term targets is crucial for industrial and financial actors, who generally think in multi-decade timeframes. Their investment, technology, and strategy choices can determine emissions trajectories in the long run. Therefore it is indispensable for them to have a clear vision of where the EU climate policy is heading. Predictable, legally binding intermediate targets and aligned NECP trajectories provide reference points against which they can adjust their decisions. Conversely, legal uncertainty, regulatory rollbacks, or weakening measures increase risks and undermine predictability and investor confidence.

The legal importance of setting medium-term targets was also reinforced in 2024 by a European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) judgment in the case of KlimaSeniorinnen v. Switzerland. According to the judgment, states must provide effective protection against the severe impacts of climate change, and this protection presupposes the existence of a clear and verifiable emissions trajectory. As a general principle, the ECHR held that a realistic path to climate neutrality by 2050 requires states to take immediate steps and define the appropriate, quantified intermediate targets for the period until 2050.

According to the EC’s communication on the EU-wide assessment of the final updated NECPs, published on May 28, 2025, national plans play a key role in ensuring that the 2030 commitments map out a consistent path to the 2040 and 2050 climate targets. The communication also stated that a legally established 2040 goal would create a stable and predictable environment for industry and investors, helping business decisions that support the clean energy transition.

The assessment also stressed that economic growth and decarbonization had, until then, advanced in tandem in the EU, and that the comprehensive implementation of the NECPs would help the EU reach its 2030 targets. By 2023, the EU’s net greenhouse gas emissions had decreased by 37% compared to 1990, while GDP increased by 68% over the same period. At the press conference presenting the NECP assessments, EC First Executive Vice-President for Clean, Just and Competitive Transition Teresa Ribera highlighted that the EU is capable of meeting the 55% emissions reduction target and needs to shift its focus to creating the conditions required to reach a 90% reduction by 2040.

The Current Status of the 2040 Climate Goals

On December 12, 2019, the European Council, responsible for setting the EU’s strategic direction, adopted conclusions that set climate neutrality by 2050 as a target, in line with the Paris Agreement. One day earlier, the European Commission released a non-binding communication on the European Green Deal, which also included the aforementioned goal. At the same time, the EC stated that it would submit a proposal for a binding climate legislation by the end of March 2020 to ensure implementation. The European Climate Law, adopted and coming into force in 2021, made the climate neutrality target legally binding. It also established a target of 55% net emissions reduction by 2030, compared to 1990.

However, the law did not set a medium-term target; it only stipulated that the EC must submit a proposal, based on an impact assessment, regarding the target to be met by 2040. The EC fulfilled this commitment, proposing an amendment to its regulation in July 2025 that provided for a 90% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2040, compared to 1990. The proposal then entered the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Council and the European Parliament.

The Danish presidency in the second half of 2025 aimed to adopt a general approach to the legislative proposal at the September 18 Environmental Council. However, the meeting did not produce a breakthrough. Ministers could not reach political consensus on either the 2040 target figure or the EU’s 2035 commitments to be submitted to the UN.

In the end, they issued a non-binding statement of intent specifying that emissions reduction should be in a 66.25–72.5% range by 2035, compared to 1990. This implies that a decision on the details and the final goal will be delayed, raising the risk that adoption of the target could be delayed—or fail altogether. However, the EC stated that it wanted to finalize the EU’s position quickly so the EU could submit its 2035 commitments (called nationally determined contribution, or NDC) before the COP30 in Belém begins.

The Limits of Implementation

Developments in recent months signal that implementation of the Green Deal is reaching a more complex political terrain. This became particularly evident in the agricultural sector. The EC’s strategic vision of agriculture and food relegated Green Deal targets to the background to ease regulations, shifting the focus toward improving competitiveness and farmers’ livelihoods rather than further tightening environmental regulations.

The debate also concerns other elements of the Green Deal. Citing excessive administrative burdens, the EC announced its intention to withdraw the draft Green Claims Directive on substantiation and communication of explicit environmental claims on products. Meanwhile as part of the so-called simplified Omnibus package, easing corporate sustainability-reporting obligations has also been put on the agenda. This could lead to weakened environmental and human rights safeguards, since only one in five companies would still have to produce an environmental report after the changes. Moreover, large companies, institutional investors, and civil society organizations have issued repeated warnings that weakening transparency and sustainability safeguards can undermine competitiveness, investor confidence, and long-term development.

Notably, the EC proposed the withdrawal of a directive that it had already submitted. Similar decisions are rare; they generally occur when a legislative process stalls or when an emerging compromise is far from the original goals. In short, what is unfolding is more than fine-tuning certain sector-specific tools: it is the revision of the Green Deal’s entire implementation system, with a particular focus on burden sharing, transition scheduling, and accountability.

Even though the 2040 climate target will be established through EU legislation, the credibility of its implementation will mostly depend on the substance and soundness of the NECPs on which it is based. Under the Regulation on the Governance of the Energy Union, all member states must present plans outlining the trajectories they intend to follow to contribute to shared climate targets. However, these documents often show formal compliance rather than genuine strategic planning.

Even though the NECPs are the EU’s tools for integrated planning and coordination, they are usually not tied closely to national budgets, investment, or grid development plans. They also differ substantially in structure, content, methodology, and the assignment of institutional responsibilities. This complicates comparability and undermines the credibility of EU-level evaluations.

This directly affects financial viability: without detailed budgets and timelines, investors face greater risk, which can lead to higher costs, shorter contracts, and slowed network development.

Therefore, NECPs mapping out the 2030 trajectory are more than administrative documents: their substance fundamentally affects whether long-term targets are backed by real implementation capacity and investor confidence. National plans that lack detail, coordination, and financial viability can severely limit the practical feasibility of shared EU targets.

Debates Over the 2040 Targets

According to press reports, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Spain support reducing emissions by 90%. Italy and the Czech Republic, however, favor a more measured approach, citing feasibility risks and cost implications. France argues that the only way to make 2040 targets credible is to coordinate them with EU trade policy, and to enforce the principles of effectiveness, flexibility, technology neutrality, and competitiveness. In September, Germany sided with France and supported its proposal that the EC discuss the 2040 target at a higher political level. As a result, the Danish presidency dropped its plan to quickly reach a qualified majority agreement on a shared member state position at the September Council meeting.

Another provision in the EC’s proposal also came under heavy criticism. It would permit the 2040 climate target to be met by using high-quality international carbon credits for up to 3% of reductions, from 2036 onward. This provision would align with the Paris Agreement’s emissions trading framework. Carbon credit trading is based on purchasable units that represent a specified quantity of carbon dioxide or an equivalent amount of emissions reduction or avoidance.

Currently carbon credits operate in two main systems. One works at national, regional, or international level and is regulated by authorities. The other works through voluntary markets.

According to a 2024 World Bank report, several compulsory regulations are developed worldwide, including the European Union, South Africa, Australia, Saudi Arabia, China, Kazakhstan, Colombia, and the United States. Voluntary credits may also be certified and registered by private standards bodies. Examples include Verra (based in the United States) and the Columbian Cercarbono. To compensate for excessive emissions, Boeing and ExxonMobil have also purchased carbon credits, and a Carbon Brief analysis reports that other buyers include Shell, Volkswagen, and Chevron.

Emissions trading can help advance Paris Agreement goals, but it is crucial to integrate robust safeguards, as there are growing concerns about carbon credit trading. Some major emitters purchase credits, and this often does not produce real-world emissions reduction. Instead, it can function as a form of compensation marketed to consumers as more sustainable business practice.

In many cases, the value of such compensation is also questionable. The Guardian published an analysis in 2024 revealing that almost half of the 3.7 million carbon credits purchased by ExxonMobil supported projects that did not prove successful. A 2024 Financial Times article reported that Shell registered 5.2 million carbon credits in Canada without actually removing any carbon dioxide. A 2025 investigation by Reuters uncovered even more flagrant breaches. The news agency looked into carbon credit projects across the Brazilian Amazon rainforest and concluded that, in 24 out of 36 cases, authorities had imposed penalties for unauthorized clear-cutting, illegal removal of fallen branches, and providing false data to the state logging information system.

The most extreme case is linked to a project led by Ricardo Stoppe, who was arrested in 2024 by Brazilian authorities for supervising an illegal logging network. According to the charges, Stoppe used revenues from credits claimed to fund nature-restoration activities to finance and conceal illegal operations. On top of that, logging in many cases took place on Indigenous land. Many of the suspicious credits mentioned in the Reuters investigation were registered by Verra and Cercarbono. The companies launched internal investigations, but the case highlights how the absence of central oversight, binding rules, and uniform certification methodologies can lead to serious abuses.

Biodiversity is directly connected to climate. Ecosystems are highly endangered by the harmful effects of climate change. This matters because robust biodiversity underpins human life—supporting food systems, medicine, and water supply—and the global economy relies heavily on it. A 2020 World Economic Forum report estimated that half of global GDP depends on nature and biodiversity. Healthy ecosystems also support climate adaptation and help mitigate impacts, as the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) confirmed in its 2024 nexus assessment.

Protecting biodiversity is also an EU priority within and beyond its borders. The EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 declared the EU’s intention to become a global leader, aiming to serve as a model for the rest of the world. The Council conclusions setting the framework for negotiations on the sixteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2024 highlighted that biodiversity loss is a global threat to humankind and therefore requires transformative change.

As many observers have noted, the EC’s proposal to allow international carbon credits could prove counterproductive and undermine the credibility of the EU’s bid to lead in global environmental policy. In June 2025, more than 130 civil society organizations and representatives from academia and the corporate world addressed an open letter to the EC, explicitly emphasizing problems linked to international carbon credits and warning that irregularities could damage the EU’s credibility and global standing. The current proposal lacks adequate social and environmental safeguards, which could lead to severe harms, including human rights violations.

UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of Indigenous Peoples José Francisco Calí Tzay also drew attention to the risk of human rights violations in 2023. According to him, the voluntary system runs short of adequate human rights and environmental safeguards and can even help the fossil-fuel sector and other high-emitting companies continue their activities. Some countries, such as Honduras and Papua New Guinea, have placed moratorium on voluntary carbon credits until they design their own compulsory regulations. The Maasai International Solidarity Alliance issued a report in 2025 examining projects in Northern Tanzania and concluding that, in many cases, the Indigenous peoples’ right to free, prior, and informed consent after being appropriately informed was disregarded. It also argued that carbon credits could become a new tool for unlawful land grabbing from Indigenous communities. The report therefore urged international and national action, including the adoption of moratoria.

Toward a Credible 2040 Climate Target

The EC complied with its legal obligations by proposing a 2040 climate target. The proposal is an indispensable step toward its long-term vision. However, the target’s future and credibility hinges on whether it is backed by national plans with viable implementation pathways, stable legal and market frameworks, and clear mechanisms for responsibility and financing.

Carbon credit trading can form an important element of this framework, provided that appropriate safeguards prevent abuse and greenwashing. However, there are significant concerns about the section of the EC’s proposal that would allow targets to be met through international carbon credits—particularly because the EU’s Green Claims Directive is still pending.

Even if it could be guaranteed that carbon credits would not be used for greenwashing or to environmental harm, direct emissions reductions should remain the primary route to meeting targets, with carbon removal and storage playing a secondary role. It is also important to prioritize nature-based solutions: briefing materials by the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change have also noted that many engineered approaches can involve greater environmental and societal risks than benefits, unlike nature-based measures such as ecosystem restoration.

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